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grounded in the Constitution so that judges do not become indistinguishable from legislators, thereby undermining the legitimacy of,
and public respect for, the Court.
Unavoidably, the Supreme Court is a political institution. The
Constitution points to broad objects which cannot be adequately
encompassed within a legalistic-historic formulation such as the
search for original intention. Nor does the Constitution make an
exception of the Supreme Court: as with the other two branches, its
independence can and should be politically restrained by the other
branches. As Tocqueville noted, in America Supreme Court judges
must be statesmen. But they must also be judges, whose training
and important, but not exclusive, responsibility for interpreting the
Constitution make their work significantly different from that of the
other two branches.
Thus the most significant task for scholarship on the Court is,
it seems to me, to articulate an alternative jurisprudence to the too
narrow, restrictive view of the interpretivists and the open-ended,
unrestrained approach of the non-interpretivists. Such a jurisprudence would be grounded in a sufficiently broad understanding of
constitutionality to allow the Court ample scope for protecting liberty. At the same time, it would be informed by the broad clauses
and objects of the Constitution and the political thought which supports it, including the recognition that the Supreme Court itself embodies, while it is also responsible for helping to resolve, the
inherent tension in a liberal democracy between popular government and liberty.
DANIEL A. F ARBER36
While there are exceptions, most of the major scholarship in
the past ten years has focused on constitutional theory. We have
seen endless debates about the role of text, original intent, and political philosophy in constitutional law. Yet we seem to have learned
little that is new about how to decide constitutional issues.
The originalism debate is a good example. The originalist view
is supposedly that the meaning of the Constitution is completely
determined by the views of its framers. It is relatively easy to show
that if "original intent" is supposed to be a matter of historical fact,
it is difficult to define its meaning, ascertain its content, or explain
why it should be determinative. (The basic error, of course, is taking "the consent of the governed" to be a matter of simple historical
36. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor of
Law, Stanford University.
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fact.) It is almost as easy to show the absurdity of ignoring historical understandings altogether, as if we had all awakened one morning to find that our government was controlled by a piece of
parchment in the National Archives.
Of course, nobody sensible takes either of these extreme positions. Reasonable people agree that historical intent informs but
does not always control interpretation-the real dispute is about
matters of degree rather than pristine theory. Similarly, not even
the strongest believers in original intent completely reject the idea of
the "living constitution"; even Raoul Berger accepts Brown and
Richard Epstein is willing to live with the Social Security Actwhich goes to show that even the most doctrinaire scholars must at
some point recognize historical and political realities.
Ultimately, most of the debate involves how creative judges
should be in constitutional cases. Theorists have staked out some
untenable extreme positions, but the real question is one of degree:
not whether judges should be creative, but how often and how
much. Questions of degree tend to be messy and contextual, while
theorists thrive on order, elegance, and universality. Yet the question of how courts should decide constitutional cases may be no
more amenable to grand theory than the question of how to paint a
good picture.
In our fascination with the Big Think theory, we have overlooked some other very interesting problems. To begin with, we
have given scant attention to much of the Supreme Court's work.
The Court has been doing odd and intriguing things in equal protection cases, for example, but no one seems much interested. Apparently, analysis of the Court's decisions has come to seem unbearably
pedestrian to many law professors.
Second, we have slighted the policy issues in constitutional
law. For example, some very respectable economists believe that
affirmative action in employment either has done nothing to help
blacks or has actually hurt them. In all the law review discussions
of the legality of affirmative action, it is hard to find a serious discussion of its desirability. Similarly, we find little discussion of the
practical effects of busing, or liberalized abortion, or a dozen other
major constitutional issues.
Third, our obsession with constitutional theory has tended to
emphasize the uniqueness of federal constitutional law. So we have
paid little attention to state constitutional law, or even more importantly, the developing body of constitutional law elsewhere in the
world. From all the discussions about judicial legitimacy, you
would think judicial review was a unique aberration, requiring spe-
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cial justification. It would probably be more accurate to say that
some form of judicial review is now the norm in democracies.
There are a lot of interesting things for constitutional scholars
to look into. Unfortunately (given its prominence in recent years),
grand theory doesn't seem to be one of them.
DAVID P. BRYDEN37
The other day I received, as an alumnus, a message from Dean
Vorenberg of Harvard Law School. Listing some of the school's
achievements, he related that Harvard now has "13 courses and
seminars in constitutional law, in addition to five sections of the
basic 'second-year' course," plus "six courses in the field of international human rights." If this issue of Constitutional Commentary
survives until the twenty-fifth century, I suspect that the dean's revelation will be interesting to students of twentieth-century American culture.
As Americans, as lawyers, and as constitutional scholars, we
take rights very seriously indeed. In a citizen this is sometimes a
virtue, but in a scholar it is more often a vice. Many of our readers
have never studied the history of liberty except in a constitutional
law course. For this and other reasons, they are in perpetual danger
of equating the progress of liberty with the progress of law, and the
progress of law with the progress of constitutional rights.
We begin with cases; almost inevitably we often treat doctrine
as an end in itself, a tendency that is reinforced by normal human
laziness as well as the quest for maximum scholarly output.
Although we know better, we habitually imply-if only by our silence-that if the Court hadn't acted nothing would have been
done about a problem, and that the Court's decision had important
consequences. Prior to Muller, we imply, working hours were not
growing shorter except under statutory compulsion; after Muller,
our readers are left to infer, the problem was solved. Miranda, we
presume, created dramatic new realities in the interrogation room.
Griswold, some imply, was a landmark in the evolution of sexual
liberty; I doubt that most law students could even begin to describe
the origins-mostly non-legal-of privacy in the home. Roe was
necessary, says popular mythology, because legislatures weren't reforming abortion laws; and if it is overruled abortion "will be illegal."
Such assumptions are often half-truths at best. Left
unchallenged, they fortify the American tendency to over-glorify
37.
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